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Who's Causing the Harm?
Catherine A. Hardee'
My parents started a software company out of our family room when I was just lve
years old As a child, the business felt like the sixth member of our family A fourth chid
who grew up alongside my sisters and me and whom my parents tmggled with, stressed
over, and strove to infuse with their values just as they did their flesh and blood children.
Take pide in your work and stand behind what you do appled equally to homework and
product launches. The Golden Rule to treat others as you would like to be treated meant
that, long before mandates, my parents provided all their employees with health insurance
anda iving wage. Along the way corporate documents were drawn up and the corporation
was "born, "a legal resident ofour home state of Washington. But such formalties were an
inconsequentialbp compared to the seemingly endless discussions around the dinner table
about coding issues; playing hide and seek in successively arger ofce spaces; or watching
my parents put on a good face while they stressed over sales numbers.
Myfamily's business i  the classicAmeican success tory Whatstartedin our den now
occupies a small oFice building housing several dozen employees. My older sister and her
husbandhave taken over the business-the next generation ofthe family enterpise. There
has never been a formal corporate poicy instmcting the business: 'Don't be evil. "Instead
my parents, and now my sister, mn a company that mirrors their personal beiefs about
honesty, integrity, moralty, andhard work. A business that reflects who we are as a family
Envisioning my family without the business is dffcult but the idea that the corporation
could existapartfrom my family simply does not compute.
'Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law;J.D., New York University School of Law;
B.A., University ofWashington. I would like to thank my fellow presenters and the participants at the Kentucky
Law Journal Symposium on Religious Exemptions and Harm to Others for their insights. I would also like to
thank the editorial staff of the Kentucky Law Journal for organizing an engaging symposium and for their
exemplary editing work on this piece. The helpful feedback I received from my colleagues Thomas Barton and
Jessica Fink is also greatly appreciated. Finally, a special thank you to my research assistant Sara Gold and the
helpful research staff of the California Western School of Law library, especially Robert O'Leary.
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INTRODUCTION
The story of my family's business is not unique. Starting a business and "being
your own boss" is a key part of the American dream.
2 Entrepreneurship represents
a quintessentially American path for success and a way to pass your legacy on to your
children.2 As a result, owners of small businesses and family-owned businesses
frequently see themselves as having a unity of interest with their business, describing
their relationship to their company in intimate terms.3
Despite this cultural view of small and family owned businesses, as the Supreme
Court will undoubtedly grapple with more requests for religious exemptions by
family businesses," it is important to keep in mind the separation corporate law
requires between a corporation and its shareholders. s Courts and some
commentators are tempted to see small businesses or family-run businesses as having
a unity of interest with their owners.' This view is understandable given our cultural
understanding of closely held corporations as extensions of their owners.7
But the history of corporate law tells a different story. For centuries, the law did
treat businesses and their owners as one and the same under the law of general
partnerships and sole proprietorships with its unlimited personal liability for business
owners.' The key development found in the corporate form, however, is the
2 For example, President Lincoln, in a speech to the Wisconsin State Agriculture Society in
Milwaukee, praised the entrepreneurial spirit that can "free" individuals from wage labor, stating:
The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or
land, for himself; then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new beginner to help him.
This, say its advocates, is free labor-the just and generous, and prosperous sy tem, which opens the way for all-gives
hope to all, and energy, and progress, and improvement of condition to all.
Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin (Sept. 30, 1859), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 471, 478-79 (Roy P.
Basler ed., 1953).
2 See Chris Isidore, Immigrants Made American Business What It Is Today, CNN MONEY (Sept.
5, 2017, 1:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/05/news/companies/immigrant-
employers/index.html [https://perma.cc/U5S3-S4K4] (discussing the role of immigrants in founding
American businesses).
3 See infra Section I.A.i.
4 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (refraining
from deciding whether corporation is entitled to religious exemption to public accommodation laws).
See infra Section I.B.i..
6 See infra Section I.A.i..
See infra Section I.A.i.
See infra Section I.A.ii. A very large number of nonemployer businesses remain under such a legal
regime as unincorporated partnerships or sole proprietorships. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. Office of Advocacy,
Frequently Asked Questions, 4 (Sept. 2012), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQSept_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V9MZ-D88M] [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions] ("Sole proprietors and
partnerships constituted 94 percent of nonemployers in 2010 .... ); see also Non employer Definitions,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/epcd/nonemployer/view/define.html
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separation of the owners and the business.' That separation is the foundation upon
which corporate law is built, including providing a justification for limited liability
and perpetual ife.'0 The story of corporate law admittedly is complicated by relatively
recent changes to corporate law and the emergence of new limited liability forms.
States have been willing to allow small businesses to alter certain aspects of corporate
law that have proven unwieldy for small business entities, perhaps justifying the
feeling that closely held corporations are once again mere appendages of their
shareholders." Where most states have held the line, however, is enforcing the
separateness requirement where third parties may be harmed.2
Prior to the Hobby Lobby decision," when faced with a rights claim by a
corporation, the Supreme Court almost exclusively gave the corporation itself the
ability to exercise the right in question, respecting and furthering the corporate
form.14 These decisions reflect the legal reality of corporate separation. The Hobby
Lobby decision, on the other hand, gives shareholders the right to utilize the
corporation as a vehicle to exercise their personal religion." Rather than treating the
corporation as an entity with rights that derive from its aggregate members, Hobby
Lobby treats the corporation as merely a collection of individuals who may use the
corporation to express their personal religion.'6 In so doing, arguably, the Court
adopts the cultural view of small businesses as alter egos of their owners. While this
may appear to be a minor distinction, it strikes at the heart of state corporate law.
This break from precedent has particular relevance to the concern that religious
exemptions have the potential to cause harm to others. When considering the harm
caused by granting religious exemptions, an important aspect to consider is who is
empowered to cause that harm. Under Hobby Lobby, the answer to who is causing
the harm is neither a corporation nor an individual, but rather an individual granted
the powers and privileges afforded corporations under state law. Given the sheer
number of small and/or family-controlled businesses, the potential for harm caused
by these super-charged shareholders is not one that is contemplated by state
corporate law.
[https://perma.cc/PD89-7PYG] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) (discussing the definition of nonemployer
businesses).
See infra Section I.B.
10 See Daniel J. Morrissey, Piercing All the Veils: Applying an Established Doctrine to a New
Business Ordeir, 32 J. CORP. L. 529, 536-37 (2007); see also infra Section I.B.i.
" See infra Section I.B.
12 See infra Section I.B.
13 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
14 See Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 658-60
(2016) (describing early corporate rights jurisprudence as helping to "solidify the corporate form" by giving
the corporation the ability to enforce the rights of its members). Later jurisprudence gave corporations
speech rights without concern for the protection of the individuals involved in the corporation, taking the
idea of the corporation as a separate entity a step further. Id. at 661-62.
"s See HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; infra Section II.B.; see also Kent Greenfield, In Defense of
Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 314-15 (2015) (arguing that the HobbyLobbydecision
rejects corporate separateness).
16 See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 314-15; infra Section II.B.
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I. A TALE OF TWO COMPANIES: THE SMALL BUSINEss DILEMMA
A disconnect exists between the way modern society views small businesses
and family-owned businesses as cultural enterprises and the way that
corporations- including closely held corporations- are treated under the law. The
owners of small businesses and family businesses often see a unity of identity between
themselves and their business, and, historically, the law treated these businesses as
such. But the advent of the corporate form changed the legal nature of business
without necessarily changing this cultural identity, leading to pressure to allow
flexibility within corporate forms. The requirement of legal separation, however, has
remained, leading to tension with the way business owners relate to their companies.
A. Small and Family-Run Businesses
Understanding the way that society sees small and family businesses, including
the way that such business owners see themselves, is a key part of understanding the
new doctrine of corporate personhood that is being developed by the Court in
upholding the rights claims of such entities. Legal theory has the ability to shape
social practice, but social practice also has the power to inform and shape legal theory
and doctrine.'7 To understand how the Supreme Court has shifted its theory when
evaluating claims by these businesses, it is necessary to examine the social practices
of those involved in small and family-run companies.
i. Unity and Connection in the Small and Family-Run Business
The United States is a nation of small businesses and family-run companies. Over
99% of all businesses in America are small businesses." Over half of those small
" David Millon, Theories ofthe Corporation, 1990 DUKE LJ. 201, 243 (1990) ("Theories about the
corporation depend in large part on perceptions of what corporations look like. Law embodies beliefs
about what is legitimate, and these beliefs influence the way people behave. Legal theory shapes social
practice and practice informs theory-at the same time.") (footnote omitted).
's Courts tend to use the language "closely held corporation" to draw legal distinctions between
companies with overlapping ownership and control, despite the fact that the moniker is of little value from
a definitional standpoint. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUs LIBERTY 149, 164 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (noting that
there is no single definition for the term in corporate law and the Court utilizes a "general understanding"
of the term). This Article uses the more colloquial terms of small business and family or family-run
business because the terms collectively encompass the companies that courts likely intend when using the
quasi-legal term of closely held companies-companies owned and operated by a small group of
individuals motivated by similar moral or social concerns. See id. at 164-65. It also excludes corporations
with a limited number of shareholders but likely lacking in a common moral compass, such as a start-up
funded by venture capitalists, which are also generally referred to as closely held corporations. These terms
also reflect the way that owners of such businesses describe themselves. The subjective views of such
business owners are the focus of this Part.
19 FrequentlyAsked Questions, supra note 8, at 1.
2017-2018
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businesses are home-based companies.20 Nearly half of America's reported labor
force is employed by small businesses.21 Of small businesses with reported employees,
over 40% have fewer than five employees, and 90% have fewer than twenty
employees.22 The vast majority of small businesses are nonemployers, meaning they
are a business venture without any employees on payroll, or sole proprietorships.23
These businesses, however, frequently hide the employment of family members.24
A very large percentage of these small businesses are also family-run companies.25
Academics have found it difficult to define a "family business" given the various
potential levels of involvement of family members and the intent of the family to
keep the business over generations.26 One study found that under the broadest
definition, 89% of all business tax returns are family businesses and that, when using
the narrowest definition, 54% of all businesses reporting employees are family
businesses.27 Despite the imprecise nature of the data available, using the definition
that a family business is one where "effective control of the business rests in family
hands and that at least two family members be involved as owners or managers, "28 it
is still easy to conclude that "[m]ost U.S. businesses are family owned."29
20 d
21 Id.
22 Ben Thornley, The Facts on US. Social Enterprise, HUFFPOST: BLOG (Nov. 8, 2012, 9:53
AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-thornley/social-enterprise-b_2090144.html
[https://perma.cc/59VB-FZ6T] (updated Jan. 8, 2013); Facts & Data on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship, SMALL BUs. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL, http://sbecouncil.org/about-
us/facts-and-data/ [https://perma.cc/BXG3-VXGC] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
23 See U.S. Small Bus. Admin. Office of Advocacy, Small Business Facts, 1 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/12-13_Nonemployer v%20Sole_Prop.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4TW-
LKXV]; Firm Size Data, U.S. SMALL BUs. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/advocacy/firm-size-data
[https://perma.cc/Q5C2-UFRH] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).
24 oseph H. Astrachan & Melissa Carey Shanker, Family Businesses' Contribution to the US
Economy: A Closer Look, 16 FAM. BUS. REv. 211, 213-14 (2003); see also Mitchell F. Crusto,
Unconscious Classism: Entity Equality for Sole Proprictors, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 232 (2009)
("[W]hen one takes an economic overview of the sole proprietorship, one uncovers that the sole
proprietorship, while legally owned by one person, is often a family-run business, employing family
members as functional, partial owners.") (footnotes omitted).
25 See Astrachan & Shanker, supra note 24, at 216.
26 See Astrachan & Shanker, supra note 24, at 211 (noting that the "challenge in quantifying family
businesses' collective impact is that there is no concise, measurable, agreed-upon definition of a family
business" and that criteria such as "percentage of ownership, strategic control, involvement of multiple
generations, and the intention for the business to remain in the family" are often considered); Benjamin
Means, The Contractual Foundation of Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 675, 690-91 (2014)
(describing the difficulty of defining a family business).
27 Astrachan & Shanker, supra note 24, at 216. The broadest definition of family business "requires
only that there be some family participation in the business and that the family have control over the
business' [sic] strategic direction." Id. at 211-12. The narrowest definition requires that "multiple
generations have a significant impact on the business" and that there is "more than one member of the
owner's family with management responsibility." Id. at 212, 215.
28 Means, supra note 26, at 690.
29 See id at 676.
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Given the sheer number of small businesses, it stands to reason that most
family-run companies are also small businesses, though not all are. Family-controlled
enterprises can also mean big business. More than 30% of all companies with sales
in excess of $1 billion are family-controlled enterprises.30 One report estimates that
family-controlled enterprises in the United States "employ 60% of workers and
create 78% of new jobs." In addition, "[iun one-third of S&P 500 companies ...
family members own a significant share of the equity and can influence key decisions,
particularly election of the chairman and the CEO."31
My family's connection to our business is representative of the way many owners
of small and family-run businesses think about their companies. Entrepreneurs peak
about their companies in the most intimate terms- as extensions of themselves or
part of their families.32 Small business owners ometimes draw parallels between
starting a business and giving birth and raising children. 33 Small and family
businesses are encouraged to run their businesses in line with their values and to
market the business as an expression of their personality. 34 And they do just
that: 91% of family owned businesses report that the family's values are emphasized
30 Nicolas Kachaner et al., W4'hat You Can Learn from Family Business, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.
2012, at 103, 103.
31 Claudio Fernindez-Ardoz et al., Leadership Lessons from Great Family Businesses, HARV. BUS.
REv., Apr. 2015, at 82, 84.
32 See, e.g., JUSTIN B. CRAIG & KEN MOORES, LEADING A FAMILY BUSINESS: BEST PRACTICES
FOR LONG-TERM STEWARDSHIP 89 (2017) ("[T]he most effective stewards see the business as an
extension of themselves. . .'In my experience, those genuinely serious about a role in their family business
don't see it as a job, nor a career; it is more akin to a vocation."'); Nicole Fallon, Focus on Family'Is Key
to Long-Term Family Business Success, Bus. NEWS DAILY (June 10, 2014, 5:39 AM),
https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/6567-managing-family-business.html [https://perma.cc/8HV6-
WYEC] ('What truly drives many family businesses is the sense of connection and identity the owners
and their family members feel with the business . . . . 'They're so focused on the business' [sic] success that
it's part of their identity. The business isn't the life of non-family employees. In general, they won't identify
themselves with the business being part of who they are the way family members do."').
33 One entrepreneur who is also a mother likens starting a business to having a baby. See Jillian
Darlington, Starting a Business Is Like Having a Baby, MOMCO: JILLIAN SAYS (Mar. 11, 2015),
http://momcoapp.com/starting-a-business-is-like-having-a-baby/ [https://perma.cc/Y3QB-C49V]
("Your business is your baby. You put everything into it and won't stop until it succeeds. Sometimes you
want to pull your hair out, but there's also nothing else in the world that is more fulfilling than creating
and nurturing something that you made out of love and passion."); Emmie Martin, The Founder of Ugg
Boots Explains Why You Should Treat Your Business Like a Baby, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2014, 11:11
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/treat-your-business-like-a-baby-2014-11.
34 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 32; Martin, supra note 33; Russ Alan Prince, The Importance of
Family Values in the Family Businesses [sic], FORBES (Jan. 5, 2016, 7:24 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/russalanprince/2016/01/05/the-importance-of-family-values-in-
the-family-businesses/#21cO62631023 [https://perma.cc/X8KE-6NWH]; Oksana Tashakova,
Your Business Brand Is an Extension of Your Personal Brand, ENTREPRENEUR MIDDLE EAST (Oct. 8,
2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/251371 [https://perma.cc/S74W-XNDZ]; Values, PwC
GLOBAL, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/family-business/values.html [https://perma.cc/QU4T-
ZAE6] (discussing a company providing consulting services "to help you analyse the values of your family
business, and identify opportunities to amplify them throughout your organisation and beyond").
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in the business and nearly 70% say that their "businesses contributed significantly to
their family's identity in their communities."3
Despite their size, even large, family-run companies see a unity of ownership
between the family and the business. Large, family-controlled businesses look longer
term and behave differently than companies that are not family-controlled,
suggesting that larger family-controlled businesses tend to see their futures as linked
to the business in a way that an average CEO does not. 36 For example,
family-controlled firms are less likely to lay off employees, regardless of the
company's financial performance, and a majority of family businesses "believe that
their ethical standards are more stringent than those of competing firms" and report
high rates of discussion of ethical standards throughout every level of the business.3 7
Research has shown that family-controlled businesses have "family gravity" or a
member or members of the family who "stand[] at the center of the organization,
like the sun in our solar system" and "personify the corporate identity and align
differing interests around clearly defined values and a common vision."3 These key
family members "tend to embrace strategies that put customers and employees first
and emphasize social responsibility."39
Given the connection between business and owner, it is not surprising that this
link is expressed in religious terms as well. Religion can influence how business
owners think about their role as owner, service provider, and employer.40 For the
devout, religion can be an integral part of the way they run all aspects of their
3 MASS. MUT. FIN. GRP., AMERICAN FAMILY BUSINESS SURVEY 6 (Oct. 2007),
https://www.massmutual.com/mmfg/pdf/afbs.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPW6-43BK]; see also Jamie
Moull6, Strong Family Values Bring FamilyBusiness Success, FAM. BUS. NEWSL. (Nev. State Bank, Las
Vegas, Nev.), Winter 2014, at 1, https://nevadasmallbusiness.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Family-
Business-Newsletter-Winter-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9MC-N5DS] (describing the way a family
business infuses family values into the company).
36 Kachaner et al., supra note 30, at 104 ("The simple conclusion we reached is that family businesses
focus on resilience more than performance. They forgo the excess returns available during good times in
order to increase their odds of survival during bad times. A CEO of a family-controlled firm may have
financial incentives similar to those of chief executives of nonfamily firms, but the familial obligation he
or she feels will lead to very different strategic choices. Executives of family businesses often invest with a
10- or 20-year horizon, concentrating on what they can do now to benefit the next generation.").
37 MASS. MUT. FIN. GRP., supra note 35, at 6.
31 Fernindez-Arioz et al., supra note 31, at 85, 86.
3 Id. at 86.
4 See, e.g., Melinda Emerson, 12 Bible Verses Every Small Business Owner Needs, HUFFPOST:
BLOG (Apr. 15, 2015, 9:57 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/melinda-emerson/small-business-
owner-bible-b_1426541.html [https://perma.cc/Z8AC-H75Q] (updated June 15, 2012) (noting
that "[s]tarting a small business is a spiritual journey[]" and listing bible verses to
inspire business owners); Andre Yee, Business as Ministry, DESIRINGGOD
(Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.desiringgod.org/artices/business-as-ministry [https://perma.cc/6P79-
SCVM] (encouraging readers to think of their jobs as ministerial).
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business, down to such details as whether to use a limited liability form to borrow
money.4' Some entrepreneurs even cite their faith as the reason to start a business.4 2
This unity of interest between owner and business expressed in religious terms is
not just present in popular culture but bleeds into the legal discussions around
corporate rights. It is reflected in the petitioners' and amicus briefs for both the large
family-run businesses in Burwell v Hobby Lobb43 and the "mom and pop" small
business in Masterpiece Cakeshop v Colorado Civil Rights Commission.44 It can
also be seen in the words of a lesbian who owns a small business with her partner
speaking out in defense of a t-shirt maker in legal trouble for refusing to make t-
shirts for a gay pride event.45 Her defense of the business that refused to provide a
service to her community was that "[she] know[s] how hard it is to build a business
and it's very personal . . . . You put your blood and your sweat and your tears into
every bit of it."4 6
41 See, e.g., DOING BUSINESS GODS WAY Four Cornerstones and Three Key Principles,
MINDFULWORD (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.themindfulword.org/2014/business-gods-way-four-
cornerstones-three-key-principles/ [https://perma.cc/6KHN-HA5S], excerpted from SANTIAGO
RIVERA, DOING BUSINEss GOD'S WAY (2014) (describing cornerstones for running a business in
accordance with the Christian faith, including not taking business loans without a personal guaranty).
42 See, e.g., Jeff Haden, Best Reason to Start a Business? God Asked., INC. (Aug. 1, 2012),
https://www.inc.com/jeff-haden/can-god-call-you-to-start-a-business.html [https://perma.cc/72NZ-
ZLQ7].
' See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 5,17, Burwellv. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(No. 13-356), 2014 WL 173487, at *5, *17 ("[T]hey cannot separate their religious beliefs from their
business practices. . . . When a religious family runs a business, the family itself is impacted by what the
business does, or what it is required to do. There is no separating the Hahns' faith from their business or
its actions."); Brief of Am. Ctr. for Law & Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7,
Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354, No. 13-356), 2014 WL 343201, at *7 ("As the
Catholic Church's Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace has tated with respect to living one's faith and
engaging in business: 'Dividing the demands of one's faith from one's work in business is a fundamental
error which contributes to much of the damage done by businesses in our world today.... The divided
life is not unified or integrated; it is fundamentally disordered, and thus fails to live up to God's call."').
44 In their petition for a writ of certiorari, Masterpiece Cakeshop and Mr. Phillips, the cakeshop
owner, argue that Mr. Phillips has "integrated" his faith into the business by treating his employees well,
closing the business on Sundays, and choosing not to sell certain products, even aside from wedding cakes
for same-sex couples. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm'n, No. 16-111 (U.S. July 22, 2016); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal Scholar Adam
J. MacLeod in Support of Petitioners at 5, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., No. 16-111 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2017)
("Many owners exercise this right to form and build together their own life plans, not only in the privacy
of the home, but also in religious assemblies, charitable works, businesses, and civic groups." (citing ADAM
J. MACLEOD, PROPERTY AND PRACTICAL REASON 74-87, 114-21 (2015))).
45 Billy Hallowel, T-Shirt Maker Who Refused to Print Gay Pride Shirts Is Being Punished-B ut
These Lesbian Business Owners Reveal Why They're Supporting Him, BLAZE (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:05
PM), https://www.theblaze.com/news/2014/11/07/lesbian-business-owners-tell-glenn-beck-why-they-
support-the-t-shirt-maker-whos-now-being-punished-for-refusing-to-print-gay-pride-shirts
[https://perma.cc/KZ3Z-SHCB].46 d.
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ii. The Unincorporated History of Small Business
The cultural view of small business as an extension of its owners is in line with
the historical treatment of businesses. For most of history, for-profit businesses were
run as general partnerships or sole proprietorships.4 7 Under the common law, neither
sole proprietorships nor general partnerships were considered separate entities from
their owners.48
Under what is sometimes known as the "solitary ego view," the law defines sole
proprietorships "solely as the alter ego of its owner;" stating that they "[have] no
separate identity from [their] owner[s]."49 The "complete identity" overlap between
the owner and her business allows a proprietor to run her business as herself without
the necessity of complying with statutory requirements for creating and maintaining
a separate entity.0 The lack of separation between owner and entity reflects a unity
of interest between them that indicates that what the business does cannot be
separated from the actions or beliefs of its owner." This unity of identity has distinct
legal disadvantages for the sole proprietor, including unlimited personal liability and
an inability for the business to contract and sue or be sued in its own right.52 The
solitary ego view of sole proprietorships continues to this day.53
47 "Until nearly the end of the nineteenth century business was generally conducted by single
proprietorships or partnerships rather than corporations. Industrial enterprises in particular, because they
did not partake of the public character of utilities or transportation facilities, remained the archetypal
private and personal business concern." Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personiication of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1443-44 (1987) (footnote omitted). Even after
the advent of the corporation, until the 1880s, corporations were restricted to the limited business activities
granted in their charters, which made them uncommon in most industries. Id at 1444.
4 Crusto, supra note 24, at 228, 253.
49 Id. at 225-26; see alsoJ. WILLIAM CALLISON &MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW
AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 2:1, Westlaw (2017) ("The key element of
the sole proprietorship is the existence of a single owner operating the business as an individual activity.
Unlike partnerships and corporations, there is a complete identity between the individual proprietor and
his or her business.").
o CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 2:1 ("A principal benefit of the sole proprietorship is its
simplicity. The proprietor does business in his or her own account, and under his or her own name or an
assumed name.").
s' Crusto, supra note 24, at 228 ("Under the solitary alter ego view, if the sole proprietorship has been
legally wronged, it is the proprietor and not the business who is the appropriate plaintiff; if the business
does wrong, the proprietor and not the business is the proper defendant.").
52 Id. at 229 ("In summary, under the solitary alter ego view of sole proprietorship, a sole proprietor
is legally disadvantaged in that, without further action, she is unable to own property in her business's
name, obtain credit in her business's name, sue or be sued in her business's name, avoid personal liability
for her business's contract and tort liability, and segregate the business's tax liability from her own personal
tax liability.").
3 See id. at 245 (arguing for modern business law to provide entity status to sole proprietorships due
to the disadvantages of the form because of the class-based nature of the form).
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A general partnership exists when "two or more persons ... carry on as co-owners
[of] a business for profit,"54 and under the common law, they were considered to be
merely an aggregation or association of individuals-persons conducting business
together with "jointly owned property and jointly incurred obligations."" Like the
sole proprietorship, the partnership was not a separate entity but rather an association
of individuals who did not take on a form separate from their business under the
law. 6 For example, due to the associational nature of the partnership, a partnership
was dissolved whenever a member of the partnership left. 7 In addition, each partner
was personally liable for any debts of the partnership. " The aggregate or
associational theory under the common law "placed emphasis on the individual rights
of each partner rather than on the collective rights of the partnership."59
The solitary ego theory of sole proprietorships and the associational theory of
partnerships align with the unity of identity expressed by many owners of small or
family-run businesses.60 The company is not a separate entity from the proprietors
or the family, but rather another facet of their identity, which family members can
build and control to reflect their values.'
Running a business as one's alter ego, however, has drawbacks. The lack of a
separate entity makes it impossible to contract or sue in the businesses' name.6 2 It
also makes it difficult to sell or continue the business after a founder's death.63
Furthermore, one of the biggest drawbacks is unlimited personal liability. Under the
common law, partners and sole proprietors were liable for the debts of the business
just as if they were their own personal debts.
64 The owners of a business were
personally responsible for the debts of the business because the law recognized no
separation between the two.65
These drawbacks are reflected in changes to the common law of partnerships.
The pure associational nature of the partnership under the common law was
unworkable for commercial enterprises in more sophisticated business environments
5 REVISED UNIP. P'SHIP ACT § 202(a) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS OF UNIP. STATE
LAWS 1997); see also Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and Functionalism
in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 407 n.64 (1989).
" See Rosin, supra note 54, at 396-97.
56 See Crusto, supra note 24, at 253 & nn.180-82.
"
7
UNIP. P'SHIP ACT § 29 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS OF UNIP. STATE LAws 1914);
CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 3:7 (describing dissolution rules as adopting the aggregate
theory of partnership law). Disassociation of a partner no longer triggers dissolution of the partnership
under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). REVISED UNIP. P'SHIP ACT § 801.
s UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 15; CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 1.2. Personal liability remains
even under RUPA. REVISED UNIP. P'SHIP ACT § 306(a).
5 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 3:1.
6o See supra Section I.A.i.
61 See supra Section I.A.i.
62 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 2:1; Crusto, supra note 24, at 244-45.
63 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 2:1; Crusto, supra note 24, at 264.
64 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 3:1 n.7.
65 See id§ 3:1; Morrissey, supra note 10, at 531.
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so eventually changes were made to begin to recognize partnerships as distinct from
their partners.66 The Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), adopted in 1914, took an
approach that sometimes maintained the aggregate theory of partnerships and at
other times utilized the concept of partnerships as a separate entity.7 The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act of 1997 ("RUPA") officially adopted the entity view of
partnerships, which has been adopted by most, but not all states." The RUPA,
however, arguably, left the most important element of the aggregate theory of general
partnership intact-the unlimited personal iability of partners.9 Thus, while the law
treats a general partnership as a separate entity for formalistic purposes, such as
bringing suit, the individual partners are still treated as having sufficient unity of
identity with the partnership to be held responsible for all partnership debts.
Although partnerships and sole proprietorships lack the advantages of limited
liability business forms, the majority of small businesses in America are still
organized as general partnerships or sole proprietorships. 7' Twenty-seven
percent of small businesses with employees are operated as sole proprietorships
" See generally Rosin, supra note 54, at 397-99 (quoting Dean Lewis, principal drafter of the
Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), as describing partnership common law as a "hopeless confusion" and
seeing the role of UPA as creating a "careful statutory expression of rules of law based on clear ideas of
fundamental principles").
67 See Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative
Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44, 77-78 (1992) (describing the UPA's inconsistent approach and
the, then still-ongoing, debate); Rosin, supra note 54, at 400 (arguing that the UPA was not a
"compromise" between the two theories of partnerships but rather reflects a functional approach
emphasizing "either the individual or the collective rights of the partners," depending on the context).
The conflict between the two theories of partnerships is attributed to the two draftsmen of the UPA-
Deans Ames and
Lewis-who disagreed on which approach was appropriate. Id. at 401-04 (describing the adoption
process). Eventually the aggregate approach was officially adopted, but scholars quickly began to argue
that the UPA, in fact, treats partnerships as a separate entity for many purposes. See, e.g., Judson A.
Crane, The Uniform Partnershiv Act: A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REv. 762, 769-70 (1915); Judson A.
Crane, The Uniform Partnershiv Act andLegal Persons, 29 HARV. L. REv. 838, 838-39 (1916). That
debate continued until the Revised Uniform Partnership Act settled the question in favor of the entity
theory of partnerships. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
6s REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 201(a) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS OF UNIF. STATE
LAws 1997) ("A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners."). The RUPA has been adopted
in forty states, as well as the District of Columbia. See Legislative Fact
Sheet - Partnership Act (1997) (Last Amended 2013), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Partnership%20Act%20(1997)%20(Last/20Am
ended%202013) [https://perma.cc/LYB6-NTQF] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018). For an example of a state
that has not adopted RUPA's entity view, see Unifund CCR Partners v. Kinnamon, 384 S.W.3d 703,
705-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that "Missouri adheres to the common-law 'aggregate theory of
partnership' and thus "a general partnership has no authority to sue in the firm name alone").
69 REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 306(a) ("[A]11 partners are liable jointly and severally for all
obligations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law."). The RUPA
does provide for the creation of limited liability partnerships, which provide for full limited liability-and
thus full entity status-for the LLP. See infra Section I.B.ii.
0 FrequentlyAsked Questions, supra note 8, at 4.
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or partnerships. 71 Of nonemployer businesses, 86% operate as sole
proprietorships-with an additional 7% run as partnerships.72
A sole proprietorship is the default business form for an individual running a
business,73 while a general partnership is the default rule for two or more individuals
operating a business4.7 Given the default rule, it may be unfair to claim that business
owners "choose" these forms, but rather that they have not actively chosen a limited
liability form. The point, however, remains that, despite their disadvantages, a large
percentage of small business owners find such forms sufficient, as evidenced by the
fact that they have not taken the minimal steps necessary to register a limited liability
entity form with the state.75
B. Corporations and the Advent ofLegal Separation
The law of general partnerships and sole proprietorships stands in stark contrast
to the law of corporations and other limited liability entities, such as the Limited
Liability Company ("LLC"). The legal advancement central to the invention of the
for-profit limited liability forms was the separation of owner and corporation. This
separation is found throughout corporate law. Over time, however, states have
blurred the separation line by allowing more flexibility to small business owners who
wish to keep management or tax structures more reminiscent of a general partnership
or sole proprietorship. Maintaining legal separation has remained the hallmark of
limited liability forms, however, especially when third party harms are involved.
i. Separation Defines the Corporation
Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, nearly all business was conducted by
sole proprietorships or partnerships.7 6 The modern corporation emerged from the
implementation of specialty charters designed to allow the aggregation of capital for
large endeavors.7 7 Eventually, larger businesses were no longer owned and operated
by one person or family but increasingly had more dispersed ownership and
71 id.
72 id.
73 Crusto, supra note 24, at 231 (noting that sole proprietorships are formed by merely conducting
business or can result from defects in creation of a corporation or LLC).
74 CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 49, § 2:3 (noting that general partnerships are created even
without a formal intention to be "partners").
7 C Crusto, supra note 24, at 266 (arguing that the sole proprietorship form disadvantages
proprietors to such an extent that they should be granted entity status at minimum for titling purposes on
equal protection grounds).
76 Mark, supra note 47, at 1443-44.
7 See id. at 1441-83, for a more thorough history of the emergence and early history of corporations.
See also Elizabeth Poilman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1633-39
(2011).
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separation of management and ownership, requiring the development of the modern
corporation.7 1
The legal separation between the corporation and its shareholders is the hallmark
of the modern corporation.79 A separate legal entity gives the corporate form many
advantages, including perpetual life, the ability to lock in capital, the ability to
contract and sue or be sued in the corporation's name, and limited shareholder
liability." Legal separation can be demonstrated by the classical model of the
corporation, which separates ownership from control."' Financial separation between
shareholder and corporate assets is required to maintain the benefits of limited
liability.8 2 These indicia of legal separation are most evident in large corporations
with dispersed shareholders, which is logical given that corporate law developed to
accommodate the needs of such entities.83 Modern corporate law was developed with
large corporations in mind and the requirements of separation required for the
corporate form reflected that fact.8
s Mark, supra note 47, at 1445 (characterizing this shift as a movement "of business from personal
to impersonal").
7 Poilman, supra note 18, at 154; Pollman, supra note 77, at 1638-39; see also Greenfield, supra note
15, at 314 ("[I]t is not an overstatement to say that corporate separateness has been one of the legal
innovations most important to the development of national wealth.").
s Pollman, supra note 77, at 1638-39, 1639 n.56; see also Crusto, supra note 24, at 230 (arguing
that sole proprietorships should have entity status so that they can take advantage of corporate features);
1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5 (2017), Westlaw (characterizing a
corporation as "an artificial person, a legal entity, capable of acting through its corporate officers and
agents, of suing and being sued, of taking and holding property, of contracting in its own name, and of
continuing to exist independently of the individuals who compose if' (footnotes omitted)).
s' William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485 (1989) ("Corporate law favored strong central direction of assets,
barred stockholders from a direct managerial voice, and accorded management considerable assurances of
tenure."); cfi Harry G. Hutchison, Religious Liberty for Employers as Corporations, Natural Persons or
Mythical Beings? A Reply to Gans, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 537, 559 (2015) (noting rules requiring
separation of ownership and control are default rules and may be modified by contract).
32 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, supra note 80, § 41.50 ("In order
to be recognized as an entity separate from its shareholders, a corporation should be operated as a distinct
and separate business and financial unit, with its own books, records and bank accounts. Evidence that
shareholders used corporate funds for personal purposes, mixed corporate and personal accounts, or
commingled assets so that the ownership interests were indistinguishable will be weighed, along with
other factors, when a disregard of corporate separateness i  pleaded." (footnotes omitted)).
13 See Bratton, supra note 81, at 1488-89 (describing development of management corporations); see
also Hutchison, supra note 81, at 553 (describing Berle and Means's influential development of the
management theory of the corporation).
4 See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5
BERKELEY BUs. L.J. 263, 281 (2008) (describing the innovations of modern corporate law tailored to big
businesses).
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ii. The Trend Toward Flexibility
As the foregoing demonstrates, there are dramatic differences between the legal
regime that developed over time to govern the small and family-run businesses that
predominated throughout most of history and the invention of modern corporate
law as a method for providing large businesses a way to raise capital. The advantage
of limited liability, however, created an incentive for small businesses to take on the
corporate form, even though it does not necessarily reflect their governing structure
or their understanding of their own relationship to the company." As a result, states
have made concessions to this desire for limited liability forms that are better suited
for small and closely held businesses."
Taking into account the needs of companies that are controlled by their owners,
states have allowed certain adaptations to the corporate form, which loosen the
requirements for demonstrating separation. For example, under the Model Business
Corporation Act ("MBCA"), the owners of non-public corporations may make
shareholder agreements to dramatically modify and simplify the corporate structure
without losing the limited liability nature of the entity. 7 With unanimous approval,
shareholders may use a shareholder agreement to dissolve the board of directors and
run the corporation directly as shareholders, much like the default rules for
partnership control of general partnerships."
New limited liability forms also provide greater flexibility to business owners who
wish to own and manage their business directly. The LLC provides a fully
customizable limited liability entity that allows a single individual to run her business
without any corporate formalities." Limited Liability Partnerships ("LLP") allow
partners to complete the entity status of the general partnership by registering the
LLP with the state to receive limited liability for all partners." These new limited
" See id at 286-88 (noting bad fit between modern corporate law and the needs of closely held
corporations); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1459, 1464 (1998) (describing the driving force behind creation of the first LLC as a desire "to
combine the tax advantages of a partnership with direct limited liability commonly associated with
corporations").
s6 See Hamill, supra note 85, at 1470-77 (discussing the rapid adoption of the LLC). The federal
government has also made exceptions to the traditional separation model with respect to taxation of
limited liability companies and S corporations. See id at 1470, 1484 n.180.
s7 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (AM. BAR AsS'N 2016).
s Id. § 7.32(a)(1).
See Jeffrey K. Vandervoort, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies: The Need for a
Better Standard, 3 DEPAUL BUS. &COM. L.J. 51, 68 (2004).
9 Robert R. Keatinge et al., Limited Liability Partnershiys: The Next Step in the Evolution of the
Unincorporated Business Organization, 51 Bus. LAw. 147, 148 (1995) ("A registered limited liability
partnership (LLP) is a general partnership, that, by registering with the secretary of state or other filing
officer, limits the individual vicarious liability of the partners for some or all of the obligations of the
partnership." (footnotes omitted)).
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liability entities are easy to create, generally requiring only registration with the
secretary of state and an indication of limited liability status in the entity's name.9
Although states have made it easier for shareholders of closely held corporations
to break down the separation between management and ownership, when parties
outside of the corporation are harmed, states have more strictly required separation.9 2
States will disregard the corporate entity and "pierce the corporate veil" to allow
recovery for corporate debts from shareholder's personal ssets when shareholders
have treated the corporation as their alter ego.93 Piercing the veil is also available in
LLCs when members have treated the entity as their alter ego.9 As a result, while
states have granted many concessions to small businesses and closely held
corporations to better align limited liability business entities with the reality of these
enterprises, some level of separation is still required to fully take advantage of the
modern business forms.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AGGREGATE ENTITY THEORY VERSUS
THE AGGREGATE UTILITY THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
An active scholarly debate has long raged regarding the nature of a corporation.
The debate includes several axes on which one can define a corporation-public or
private, concession or natural entity, and aggregate or entity." The entity/aggregate
dichotomy revolves around questions "about whether it is appropriate to equivocate
the corporation and the people behind it in rights determinations."96 Under the
aggregate entity theory, the corporation is viewed as a collective of individuals and
the corporation derives its power and rights from them.7 Most scholars agree that
the Supreme Court has failed to take a consistent position regarding the underlying
theory of what a corporation is." Many accuse the Court of being outcome driven,
91 See id at 148, 171.
92 Vandervoort, supra note 89, at 56-58.
93 See id. at 57-58; Catherine A. Hardee, Veil Piercing and the Untapped Power ofState Courts, 94
Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2969109
[https://perma.cc/4Z8N-WV8C].
94 Vandervoort, supra note 89, at 78.
95 See Pollman, supra note 18, at 155 (outlining several "dichotomies or views of the corporation").
A full discussion of the theories of corporate personhood is not possible in this limited space.
96 
d.
9' SeeJason luliano, Do Corporations Have Rehgious Beliefs?, 90 IND. L.J. 47, 58 (2015).
98 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing ofCorporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 99
(2014); Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate "Person" A NewAnalyticalApproach to a Flawed Method of
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005); Eric W. Orts, Theorizing the Firm:
Organizational Ontology in the Supreme Court, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 572 (2016). Some scholars
argue, however, that a coherent theory of corporate personhood is an unnecessary argument hat distracts
from the real question of what rights a corporation should have. See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 77, at 1647,1670-
71.
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selecting the corporate personhood theory that best supports the Justices' desired
outcome in a particular case."
Without wading into the debate over the "correct" view of the corporation,
looking at the Court's most recent forays into corporate rights reveals a subtle shift
in the Court's thinking. In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court utilized, at least in
part, the aggregate entity theory of the corporation to grant a free speech right to
corporations based on the rights of their aggregated shareholders.' Although a
corporation's right to free speech is based on the rights of its members, that right is
nonetheless held and exercised by the corporation as a separate legal entity,
furthering the conception of the corporation as a separate legal entity.'0 ' In granting
shareholders a statutory right to exercise their religion through their corporation
rather than allowing the corporation to exercise religion, the Court seems to have
put the locus of control in shareholder hands, apart from the corporation. This
stance arguably adopts the cultural view of family-controlled businesses as having a
unity of identity with their company, which allows shareholders to utilize the
corporation as an extension of themselves. In doing so, the Court bypassed the
corporate form and created an aggregate utility theory of the corporation.
A. Citizens United-Aggregate Entity Theory and Separation
Citizens United v. FECre-ignited the debate over corporate rights and corporate
personhood. The Roberts Court found that campaign finance laws restricting
political donations by corporations infringed on their freedom of speech.'02 The
Court, keeping with tradition, did not provide a clear explanation of what theory of
corporate personhood animated their holding. The majority seemed to favor the
aggregate entity theory, focusing on the rights of corporate speakers as an association
of individuals.'03 The majority, however, also placed emphasis on the utilitarian value
of speech and the rights of the listener to hear corporate speech.'04 The Court
stopped short, of creating a First Amendment right for listeners to hear speech,
regardless of the speaker. Justice Scalia's concurrence relied heavily on the aggregate
9 See, e.g., Orts, supra note 98, at 571. A thorough summary of all the Court's corporate rights
precedent is outside the scope of this Article. Several scholars have compiled insightful descriptions of
these cases. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 98, at 107-08; Pollman, supra note 77, at 1635-39; Leo E.
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties ofReconciling Citizens United
with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877, 913-17 (2016).
.oo See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43, 348 (2010).
101 See id!.
102 Id. at 351-56, 363-66.
103 See, e.g., id. at 342 ("The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to
corporations."); id. at 342-43 (stating precedent that corporations receive the same First Amendment
protections as any other association).
104 See id. at 341 ("The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from
each.... [I]t is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information
from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.").
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entity theory- positing that corporations have the same rights as the individual
stakeholders who make up the corporation.'
Despite being seen by many as a departure from previous corporate rights cases,
the Citizens Uniteddecision did track previous cases with respect to the corporation's
separation from its constituent members.0 6 To the extent that the decision was based
on the aggregate entity theory, it is consistent with the theory in that the speech
rights of the corporation were not kept and exercised by the individual shareholders,
but rather the right to exercise those rights was aggregated for the benefit of the
entity.0 7 In other words, the corporation, as a separate entity from the collection of
its members, was granted the right to speak.
Throughout the opinion, the Court reinforces the corporation's right to speak,
with little mention of the shareholders.' The only mention in the majority opinion
regarding the shareholder's individual speech rights is in response to the
government's argument that the holding will force shareholders to participate in
speech with which they do not agree. "0' The majority's response is that "the
procedures of corporate democracy" will prevent abuse."0 For this proposition, the
Court quotes the Bellotti decision, which clarifies that the procedures of corporate
democracy referenced are the shareholders' power to elect the board of directors and
sue for breach of fiduciary duties."'
The reality is that the "procedures of corporate democracy" in a public
corporation generally provide little shareholder control over corporate decisions;
105 Id. at 385-86 (Scalia,J., concurring) (criticizing dissent for not showing why the freedom of speech
does "not include the freedom to speak in association with other individuals, including association in the
corporate form"); id. at 392 ("[T]he individual person's right to speak includes the right to speak in
association with other individual persons.").
106 The Citizens United decision is problematic in many other areas of state corporate law. As the
ChiefJustice of the Delaware Supreme Court has argued, the decision raises thorny questions about the
fiduciary duties of directors in deciding to spend corporate funds on electioneering communication that
does not directly benefit the corporation. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts'
Role in Eroding "We the People's"Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 423, 440-42 (2016). In addition, the mechanics of corporate governance that the majority in
Citizens Unitedrelied on to make its determination were not designed to protect or further the speech
rights of shareholders, creating a tension between state corporate law and federal rights. See Pollman,
supra note 14, at 667.
107 See Gregory A. Mark, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Personhood: Taking the US. Supreme
Court's Reasoning at Face Value, 65 DEPAUL L. REv. 535, 542 (2016) (noting that in speech cases, the
Court "recognized that the entity spoke" through its managers regardless of the manager's personal
beliefs).
10s See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342-43.
109 Id. at 361-62.
110 Id. at 362 (quoting First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
1 Bellott, 435 U.S. at 794-95 ("Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to
insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's charter, shareholders normally are presumed
competent to protect their own interests. In addition to intracorporate remedies, minority shareholders
generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements
alleged to have been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of
management.")
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directors make decisions on behalf of the corporation, including decisions regarding
the expenditures of corporate funds."2 While it is true, as the Court notes, that
shareholders have the power to elect directors, in reality that power is minimal given
the control incumbent boards have over the process and the limited voting power
inherent in modern stock ownership."3 The power to sue a board for breach of
fiduciary duties is unlikely to result in relief unless the board has engaged in fraud or
self-dealing."4 Even the power to sell one's shares to express disagreement with
management largely is illusionary in the modern market system where most
shareholders own stock through intermediaries, such as pension plans or mutual
funds."5 The end result is that whether all, or even most, shareholders agree with
the corporation's expression, as determined by the managers of the corporation, as a
practical matter is irrelevant. Not only does the Court fail to require a determination
that shareholders agree with the corporation's speech, the result of its holding is that
shareholder dissent does not matter.
In a closely held corporation, the procedures of corporate democracy do
frequently place more control in the shareholders' hands. Majority shareholders often
have complete control over the election of the board of directors, giving them
confidence that the board will be responsive to their wishes."' Frequently, the
shareholders of a closely held corporation sit on the board of directors and exercise
direct control over the day-to-day affairs of the corporation. "' As noted,
shareholders can even dissolve the Board and run the corporation directly if they so
choose."' One could argue that the opinion thus provides shareholders in closely
held corporations with the right to speak rather than locating the right in the entity.
The argument that the Court recognized these differences in corporate control
and intended to locate the right in individual shareholders for closely held
corporations rather than the entity seems less likely, however, when one considers
the voluntary breadth of the Court's holding. The plaintiff in Citizens Unitedwas a
nonprofit corporation created to spread a political message."' The Court could have
followed its holding in Massachusetts Citizens For Life and ruled narrowly that a
112 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2017); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative
Colision Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100
CORNELL L. REv. 335, 363 (2015).
113 See Pollman, supra note 14, at 677; Strine & Walter, supra note 112, at 370 ("[T]he practical
realities of stock market ownership have changed in ways that deprive most stockholders of both their
right to voice and their right of exit.").
114 Polman, supra note 14, at 677.
... See Strine &Walter, supra note 112, at 369-70. In addition, the large quantities of capital in index
funds further mutes the messaging power of the market as many funds take large positions in a
predetermined set of funds. See id. at 372.
116 SeeWells, supra note 84, at 286-87 (discussing the power of majority shareholders to control the
corporation vis-a-vis minority shareholders).
117 See id. at 286 (discussing how closely held corporations consist of "individuals who serve
simultaneously as shareholders, directors, and employees of the firm").
... MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (AM. BAR AsS'N 2016).
119 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
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corporation created to convey a political view has a right to speak even if it receives
de minimis corporate funding.120 That right could have been derived directly from
the corporation's constituents-those who donated to or worked for the nonprofit-
because it is safe to assume that they supported the message of the organization. This
was in fact the ruling the Citizen United plaintiffs asked for in their as applied
challenge to the law.121 The Court had precedent hat would have allowed them to
hold that when a corporation is formed to spread a message, the constituent members
can express those views using the corporate form.122 Instead, the Court issued a
sweeping holding that the statute was facially invalid, even as applied to for profit
and public corporations.123 This suggests the majority not only intended to grant
speech rights to all corporations, but intended for them to be located in and exercised
by the entity, not by the individuals who constitute the corporation.
B. Hobby Lobby and the Aggregate Utility Theoy of the Corporation
The Hobby Lobby decision rests on a different footing. The Hobby Lobby
majority does not treat corporations as a separate entity but rather as a conduit
through which the owners of the corporation may express their personal religious
beliefs.124 The opinion in Hobby Lobby lacks nuance regarding the nature of the
corporation, making it difficult to determine how the Court will apply the case
moving forward,125 but a careful reading of the Court's language and the issues the
majority chose to address suggests hat the Court took a view of the corporation as
having a unity of identity with its owners. The Court provides some explanation for
why state law allows such a departure from the traditional separation requirement,126
although they are unconvincing when state corporate law is put in the correct context.
The details of the case are familiar to most readers: Five members of the Green
family owned and operated two corporations-Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and
120 Id. at 327-28 (rejecting this argument); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 242-
44,264-65 (1986).
121 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 327; see also Strine, supra note 106, at 476-77 (noting that the
Court's holding was "broader in scope than even the plaintiff... had asked for").
122 See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263-65.
123 See Orts, supra note 98, at 580 (noting the Court's broad holding, which rejected a more narrow
position regarding dissenting shareholders).
124 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) ("[P]rotecting the
free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious
liberty of the humans who own and control those companies."); see also Greenfield, supra note 15, at 314-
15; Mark, supra note 107, at 541 ("Note that to assert the rights of its owners' equity, the collective acts
of the entity are beside the point; entities exist solely as vehicles to'provide protection for human beings."').
125 See Mark, supra note 107, at 537 (noting that the Court's opinion "lacked nuance" and, as such
"it contained errors"); Pollman, supra note 18, at 150 (noting the "anemic treatment of corporate law in
HobbyLobbj'). The Court's decision in Masterpiece Cakeshopis even more opaque as the Court ignores
the corporate entity in the case and instead focuses on the "baker" and his "shop." Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
126 See HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771-72.
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Mardel, Inc. 127 Five members of the Hahn family owned Conestoga Wood
Specialties, Corp.128 Both the Green and Hahn families were devout Christians who
objected on religious grounds to the Affordable Care Act's mandate to provide
insurance plans that included certain contraceptives. 129 The individual family
members, as well as the corporations, sued to block enforcement of the mandate
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") and the Free
Exercise Clause.'30 The Court limited its holding to the RFRA claim, finding that
RFRA provides for an exemption from the neutrally applicable contraceptive
mandate.'3 '
The Court rooted its opinion in a near singular focus on the religious beliefs of
the owners of the corporations at issue. While the majority paid lip-service to other
constituencies in the corporation-employees and officers-and the notion of
control, it is clear that owners in their shareholder capacity are the only ones capable
of using the corporation to exercise their sincere religious beliefs.13 2 Employees, as a
group who may exercise the corporation's religion, drop out of the equation quickly.
The Court began by noting the groups of "people (including shareholders, officers,
and employees), . . . associated with a corporation" and stated that when a
corporation was granted rights, "the purpose is to protect the rights of these
people."'33 The majority then specifically recognized that the Fourth Amendment
rights of corporations protected the privacy interests of employees.'34 When it comes
to protecting the free exercise rights of the corporation in the case at hand, however,
employees are left out as the majority noted that their holding "protects the religious
liberty of the humans who own and control those companies."'35 The free exercise
rights of employees were not considered relevant, which is demonstrated by the fact
that if all employees shared the same religious convictions as the shareholders, there
would be no cause for concern about the insurance coverage to begin with.'36 The
majority never again mentioned the employees' right to free exercise rights vis-a-vis
the corporation.
Management's role in the corporation was given more attention. The majority
mentioned, on several occasions, that the Hahns and Greens both owned and
127 Id. at 2765.
121 Id. at 2764.
129 Id. at 2764-66.
130 Id. at 2765-66.
131 Id. at 2759-60.
132 See id. at 2768; Pollman, supra note 18, at 157-58.
133 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
134 Id
135 Id. (emphasis added); see also Mark, supra note 107, at 545 (describing how the majority opinion
limits the interests at stake to only the owners).
136 See Mark, supra note 107, at 544 (noting that "[t]he interests of employees who might be
indifferent or opposed to the free exercise claim are ignored, as might their claims of conscience or
reproductive rights, because those claims are apparently not religious"); Orts, supra note 98, at 588 ('What
happened to the rights of employees when the topic of religion within the firm arose? They simply appear
to have been ignored.").
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controlled the corporations but left many details regarding control unanswered. They
reported that Conestoga was run by a board of directors, that the Hahns "control[led]
its board of directors," and that one of the sons was the president and CEO.13 7 The
Court gave no indication, however, regarding whether there were other members of
the board and whether those directors held the same religious convictions as the
Hahns.'38 With respect to Hobby Lobby and Mardel, the Court noted that the
Greens and their children "retain[ed] exclusive control of both," that David was
CEO, and the "three children serve[d] as the president, vice president, and vice
CEO." 139 Both companies owned by the Greens were operated through a
management rust and the Court noted that each family member served as trustee.'40
While the Court was careful to lay out the methods by which the families
involved exerted at least majority control over the controlling corporate bodies-in
Conestoga through the board of directors and in Hobby Lobby through the
management trust-the majority's dicta suggested that ownership rather than
control was central to a claim for an exemption under RFRA. In dismissing the
likelihood that a public corporation could bring a successful RFRA claim, the
majority noted that it was unlikely that "unrelated shareholders" would agree to run
the corporation "under the same religious beliefs."'4' This language is in striking
contrast to the language in Citizens United emphasizing that shareholder agreement
is unnecessary for a corporation to exercise its speech rights via management.4 2 As
discussed, that decision placed the right to speak in the corporation's hands, with the
instruction to look to state law to determine who has the power to speak for a
particular corporation.'43 If the Court was recognizing the corporation's right to
exercise religion, one would expect the appropriate inquiry for a public corporation
to be whether a majority of the board of directors agrees to run the corporation under
the same sincerely held religious beliefs. " Under that metric, it would not be
surprising that a majority of a board of directors could share sincere religious
beliefs.145
'37 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764.
13' The Amended Complaint clarifies that the five members of the family were on the Board of
Directors but not whether there were any other members. First Amended Verified Complaint at ¶¶ 11-
16, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d. 394 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 5:12-CV-
06744-MSG).
139 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
1
40 Id. at 2765 n.15.
141 Id. at 2774 (emphasis added).
142 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361-62 (2010).
143 Id.
144 See Pollman, supra note 18, at 150 (suggesting that "the Court's analysis obscured the role of the
board of directors").
145 See, e.g., Holly Lebowitz Rossi, 7 CEOs with Notably Devout Religious Beliefs, FORTUNE
(Nov. 11, 2014) http://fortune.com/2014/11/11/7-ceos-with-notably-devout-religious-beliefs/
[https://perma.cc/ASK6-7MGL] (describing the religious beliefs of the CEOs of seven public
corporations). There are public companies whose boards have already agreed to integrate faith-
based practices into the corporation. See, e.g., Faith in the Workplace, TYSON,
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The "procedures of corporate democracy," which rest control of the corporation
in the hands of the board of directors and not the shareholders, appear to be
insufficient to give the corporation a right to exercise religion.'46 This reading is
buttressed by the fact that the Court ponders the outcome of a religious claim of a
corporation whose shareholders disagree about whether the corporation should
exercise a religion, but not situations where there is disagreement among
management.4 7 This dicta suggests that the right is not exercised by the corporation
as an entity but rather by the individual shareholders themselves acting through the
entity.14
Arguably, it is possible to find that a corporation exercises religion in its own
right. For example, Profesor luliano makes a compelling case that a corporation as
an entity can have a distinct separate identity, capable of exercising religious beliefs
without reliance on channeling the shareholders beliefs. " He argues that a
"group['s] beliefs are not derived from what individual members of the group actually
believe; they are derived from what individual members of the group accept as true
given their obligations to the group entity.""' Thus, "[wihen board members or
executives make decisions, they are not reporting what they personally believe to be
true; they are reporting what they positionally accept as true given their position
within the corporation.""' If the corporate charter provides a religious purpose for
the corporation, then the board will further that purpose because it is in line with the
beliefs of the corporation, despite the fact that the religious purpose may not align
with the board's personal beliefs.'52 Because the corporation will adopt positions in
line with the corporation's belief system regardless of agreement by its members, "it
is . . . reasonable to conceive of the corporation as having an independent intentional
state."'53 The sincerity of that intentional state may be judged by "examining the
corporation's historical religious commitments" and whether it has "always operated
according to the religious belief it seeks to claim protection under[]"'54
This concept of corporate religion would allow for a religious claim by even a
public corporation with no family control if its founder had operated the company
according to his religious beliefs and inserted a religious purpose in the corporate
https://www.tysonfoods.com/sustainability/workplace/faith-workplace [https://perma.cc/T3 E9-
T7CQ] (last visited Mar. 18, 2018).
146 See Pollman, supra note 18, at 168-69 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361-62)).
147 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774-75 (2014).
148 See Pollman, supra note 18, at 157 (describing the opinion as giving the corporation "the right on
a derivative basis[,]" to be used as a "tool" for shareholders to exercise their ends).
149 See luliano, supra note 97, at 49.
Id. at 86.
11Id. at 87.
152 Id. at 93 (giving an example of a three-member board of atheists who would nonetheless seek an
exemption to the contraception mandate if the charter mandates the corporation has "strong Catholic
commitments").
153 id.
154 Id. at 98.
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charter. The board would be obligated to follow the charter regardless of their
personal religious beliefs or those of its, potentially millions of, shareholders. Given
the perpetual life of corporations, this religious exemption still could be available to
the corporation long after the death of the founder, whose sincere religious beliefs
initially provided the rationale for the exemption.
The type of corporate religion Professor luliano theorized is not the religious
exercise by corporations the Court in Hobby Lobby contemplated. As noted, the
focus in HobbyLobbyis on the shareholders' sincere beliefs, not the board's decision
making process.' In addition, the documents the Court relied on to evidence the
families' sincerity of belief do not appear to be corporate documents but rather
individual promises.5 6 The statements the Court relied upon merely show the
sincerity of the shareholders' beliefs and not that such beliefs are expressions of the
corporation itself, like a statement of purpose in the corporate charter might
provide.5 7
Rather than looking at management or the corporation's documents, the Court
focuses on the Hahns and the Greens individually. The opinion most frequently
discusses the Hahns' and Greens' personal beliefs and religion. ' On several
occasions the opinion lumps the families and the companies together and utilizes an
ambiguous pronoun to describe "their" religion."' There is only one place in either
155 See supra notes 132-148 and accompanying text.
156 See Pollman, supra note 18, at 162; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Ajob IsNotaHobby: The Judicial Revival
of Corporate Paternalism andIts Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 109 (2015).
157 Strine, supra note 156, at 109 ("At least in Delaware, if a corporation wishes to have a religious
purpose, the traditional method is to set forth that purpose in the corporation's certificate of
incorporation.").
's See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,2759 (2014) (noting "the sincerely
held religious beliefs of the companies' owners"); id. ("The owners of the businesses have religious
objections to abortion[] . . . . If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be
facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy price . . . ."); id. at 2764-65
(describing the Hahns' religious beliefs and how they exercise those beliefs through Conestoga); id. at
2765-66 (describing the Greens' beliefs and how they exercise those beliefs through Hobby Lobby and
Mardel); id. at 2769 (allowing the corporations "to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of
the Greens and the Hahns"); id. at 2775 ("[T]he Hahns and Greens have a sincere religious belief that
life begins at conception."); id. at 2778 (stating that "[t]he Hahns and Greens believe that providing the
coverage demanded" is an abortion and is, thus, "immoral"); id. at 2783 ("The owners of many closely
held corporations could not in good conscience provide [coverage for abortion or assisted suicide] . . . .");
id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In these cases the plaintiffs deem it necessary to exercise their
religious beliefs within the context of their own closely held, for-profit corporations.").
159 See, e.g., id. at 2774 (noting that the companies are "each owned and controlled by members of a
single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs"); id. at 2775 ("By requiring
the Hahns and Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate demands
that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.") (emphasis added); id. at 2776
(stating that "the Hahns and Greens and their companies have religious reasons for providing
health-insurance coverage for their employees[,]" and noting that, before the ACA, they provided
insurance "because their religious beliefs govern their relations with their employees"-demonstrating that
the Court sees owner and corporation as interchangeable); id. at 2779 ("[T]he Hahns and Greens and
their companies sincerely believe that providing the insurance .... ).
Vol. Io6774
Who's Causing the Harm?
the majority or the concurrence where the language suggests a corporation is capable
of religious beliefs.'60 On the other hand, the majority was able to express entity
beliefs when talking about not-for-profit entities, stating "[tihe Mennonite Church
opposes abortion and believes that '[t]he fetus in its earliest stages . . . shares
humanity with those who conceived it.""' Despite this, nowhere in the opinion does
the Court so clearly ascribe a belief system to Hobby Lobby or Conestoga.'62
The opinion in Hobby Lobby makes it relatively clear that, in order to claim a
RFRA exemption, the shareholders must be exercising their personal, sincerely held
religious beliefs through the corporation rather than the corporate entity exercising
religion. In other words, RFRA exemptions are only available to shareholders who
see their business as an inseparable facet of their personal or familial identity such
that their most personal beliefs are imputed to the corporation.'63 The corporation is
merely a tool to be utilized in the expression of their personal religious beliefs.
Perhaps the Court took this path because an opinion that clearly stated that a
corporation holds sincere religious beliefs would have challenged the notion of what
we mean by sincere beliefs. The notion that ExxonMobil could declare itself to be a
Presbyterian is absurd on its face. Even stating that Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
"believes" in the teachings of Jesus Christ challenges traditional conceptions about
the nature of religious belief. Instead of a ruling that would challenge the sanctity of
religious beliefs, the Court adopts a definition of the corporation that is more in line
with the way the owners of small and family-run businesses think of themselves than
the way they are treated under the law.
The Court justifies its focus on the shareholders' beliefs by stating that,
"[c]orporations, 'separate and apart from' the human beings who own, run, and are
employed by them, cannot do anything at all."' 64 While that may be true in a physical
sense-a corporation cannot physically sign a contract, for example, without human
assistance-it is incorrect from a legal standpoint. The benefit of the corporate form
is that the corporation can do many things-like sue or be sued, enter into contracts,
borrow money, or own property eparate and apart from the human beings that
.6o Id. at 2777 ("doubt[ing] that the Congress that enacted [the] RFRA-or . . . [the]
ACA-[wanted] to put family-run businesses to the choice of violating their sincerely held religious
beliefs or making all of their employees lose their existing healthcare plans"). Interestingly, this language
occurred in the discussion regarding whether the corporations could avoid the fine by canceling health
insurance entirely. So, the "belief' at issue was not the specific belief that life begins at contraception but
a more general belief that businesses should provide health insurance to their employees, which could be
seen as a more broadly held Judeo-Christian value in line with the Golden Rule. See Matthew 7:12 (King
James).
161 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764 (alteration and omission in original).
162 This difference is somewhat at odds with the majority's rejection of the difference between
for-profit and nonprofit corporations' abilities to exercise religion. See id. at 2769; see also Mark, supra
note 107, at 540 (noting that the Mennonite church is ascribed beliefs while the corporations at issue are
not).
163 See Pollman, supra note 18, at 157.
164 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
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own and operate it. 65 The owner or manager who signs a contract on behalf of the
corporation does not become personally liable for that debt because of the legal
separation of the corporate entity.
The majority's justifications for allowing shareholders to exercise their personal
beliefs through the corporate form are unconvincing as they do not actually evidence
a breakdown of the separation between shareholder and corporation. The Court uses
the fact that corporations can donate money to charitable causes or go above and
beyond regulations based on social aims as evidence that state corporate law permits
shareholders to treat corporate entities as extensions of themselves.'6 But these acts
are capable of being exercised by the corporation itself, as evidenced by the fact that
they can be undertaken without any inquiry into the beliefs of any of the corporation's
constituent members.
With respect to entity status, corporate charity merely stands for the proposition
that those who control the entity have the authority to decide what is in the best
interest of the corporation within the parameters of corporate law, which governs the
relationship between corporate constituents'7 Even taking as accurate the Court's
statement that state corporate law does not require profit maximization, that fact is
best seen as altering the view of intra-corporation relationships to include other
stakeholders as corporate constituents.' While corporate charity and religious acts
by corporations may be indicative of the sincerity of the beliefs of those who run the
corporation-its board of directors or the shareholders who elect them-the fact that
state corporate law allows for such acts does not indicate a lack of entity separation.
The people who make decisions on behalf of the corporation will always be guided
by their personal beliefs, but subject to the requirements of corporate law.
The request for exemptions granted in Hobby Lobby represents a corporate
decision that is different in kind. It requires a professed unity of interest with the
corporation not found in other corporate decisions, even ones relating to religion.
The condition that RFRA exemptions are only available when shareholders are
motivated by sincerely held religious beliefs demonstrates this difference.' A
corporation, even a public corporation, may decide to engage in acts of corporate
charity or religion, even if no one involved in the entity holds those beliefs.170
Corporations may donate money to help the environment out of a sincere desire to
165 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
166 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
167 The business judgment rule provides directors with broad discretion to engage in corporate charity
or other socially desirable behavior as long as it is couched in a concern for the corporation's welfare. Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Essay, The Dangers ofDenial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding ofthe Power
andAccountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 761, 776 (2015).
16s See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 328-29 (describing the corporate social responsibility
movement's efforts to replace profit maximization with fiduciary duties that extend "to employees and
other corporate stakeholders"); Hardee, supra note 93.
169 See discussion supra pp. 863-64.
170 See luliano, supra note 97, at 90-93.
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make a positive impact or as a crass money grab for environmentally friendly
customers. 17' A public corporation may employ chaplains to minister to their
employees and promote spirituality among their ranks, whether it is a closely held
corporation run by an evangelical founder or a public company with diffused
shareholders.172 While individuals must make these decisions, they are decisions of
the corporation and are treated as such under the law.
This, however, is not so for the ability to claim exemptions from the law under
RFRA. The decisions to opt out of a neutrally applicable law must be made by
individuals to further their own personal religious beliefs rather than prioritizing
other stakeholders.173 This turns corporate social responsibility on its head. As one
prominent commentator notes:
Whereas the pursuit of corporate social responsibility often entails
questions of whether the board of directors can put nonshareholder
interests ahead of those of shareholders in order to surpass legal
compliance, the pursuit of religious accommodation asks the law to bend
around the shareholders' will to avoid generally applicable laws.174
The same can be said about the existence of benefit corporations, which the
majority also raised as an indication that state corporate law allows for an overlap of
economic and other interests. 175 Benefit corporations require the corporation to
consider stakeholders other than shareholders when making corporate decisions.1'7
In this way, they are similar to constituency statutes, which allow "corporate directors
to consider interests other than those of their shareholders when exercising their
corporate decision-making authority."'7 7 Regarding both, one could argue that the
171 See, e.g., Jacob Vos, Note, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate
America, 23 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS &PUB. POL'Y 673, 674,677 (2009) (describing "greenwashing"
where corporations overstate their environmental impact to lure consumers).
172 For example, Tyson Foods was founded by the Tyson family, whose founder was a devout
Christian and whose grandson, a born-again Christian, is now the CEO. Justin Rohrlich, Religious
CEOs: Tyson Foods' John Tyson, MINYANVILLE (May 19, 2010, 5:25 AM),
http://www.minyanville.com/special-features/articles/john-tyson-christian-church-chaplain-
methodist/5/19/2010/id/28276 [https://perma.cc/NC6K-4JX9].The company is now a public company,
but it still provides 120 chaplains to minister to employees and donates 25,000 booklets that "guide
families through the process of saying grace at the dinner table." Id.
173 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014) (rejecting difficulty of
determining sincerity of belief of a corporation because the owners sincerely believed).
174 Pollman, supra note 18, at 170.
... HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. It is interesting that the Court raised this point because none
of the parties to the litigation had opted to actually use the benefit corporation form. See Strine, supra
note 156, at 107.
176 See Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 121, 142 (2016) (describing benefit corporations as requiring "a corporate purpose of creating a
general public benefit' and "consider[ation of] non -shareholder interests (such as impact on employees,
community, and the environment) when making business decisions") (emphasis added).
177 Nathan E. Standley, Note, Lessons Learnedfrom the Capitulation ofthe Constituency Statute, 4
ELON L. REV. 209, 212 (2012) (emphasis added). Constituency statutes differ from benefit corporations
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religiously motivated owners of corporations are thinking of others when they
request exemptions from the law-other members of their faith, those favoring fetal
life, those concerned with the sanctity of marriage, etc.
The majority's singular focus on the sincerely held religious beliefs of the
shareholders, however, weakens this comparison. The right to an exemption from
the law was not given to advance the interests of anyone but the shareholders."' To
look at the issue from another angle, it seems unlikely that a benefit corporation
could claim an exemption to a neutrally applicable law because it believed violating
the law was necessary to further its social mission. This is arguably true even if that
social mission aligned with the goals of some religious faiths. Without the
shareholders' desire to express their own religious beliefs, even a benefit corporation
may not opt out of the law on the grounds of furthering a social good.
Interestingly, the Court did not mention the elements of state law that actually
challenge the separation between corporation and shareholder. Perhaps this is
because the shareholders of the corporations at issue had not taken advantage of such
devices, like altering the management structure so shareholders directly manage the
corporation.'
CONCLUSION: THE SUPER SHAREHOLDER IS CREATED
When you total the number of small businesses and family-run enterprises, their
owners have an enormous impact on the lives of their fellow citizens. Through
employment, the provision of goods and services, and their impact on the electoral
process, owners of small businesses and family-run businesses have an outsized
influence in society.' If you are running a family business, that may not seem like a
bad thing. My family has done wonderful things with its business, including
benefiting employees and the community in which it operates, and will continue to
have a positive impact for years to come. Much of that comes from the values and
beliefs that my parents and sister have used to guide their decisions. There is
undeniably room for business to do good.
But even well-meaning people can harm others in the pursuit of a noble goal.
History is replete with examples of business owners engaging in "benevolent
paternalism" -mandating church attendance and dictating moral standards to their
employees down to the condition of their homes, their appearance, and how they
in that they were initially enacted to allow boards to defend against hostile takeovers and some statutes
still retain that focus. See id. at 218-19.
..s See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (holding that protecting the corporation's rights "protects
the religious liberty of the humans who own and controlthose companies") (emphasis added).
179 See, e.g., id at 2764 (describing Conestoga as being run by a board of directors).
'so Strine, supra note 106, at 473 n.209; see also Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerisn, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1455-56 (2015) (describing the demands that various corporations have made on
government regulators);
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spend their wages.'"' Henry Ford was determined to create a "corporation with a
soul," which he achieved by setting up a "Sociological Department" to monitor and
evaluate every aspect of the lives of his workers and their families to make sure they
"were living their lives according to middle class, Protestant values."18 2 More recently,
neutrally applicable laws have prevented such personal intrusions. For-profit
corporations have been unsuccessful in their efforts to thwart antidiscrimination laws
to force employees to attend trainings "that teach, for example, that women's place
is in the home" and to discriminate against non-Christians, "co-habiting couples,
gay[s] . . ., and women working without the consent of their fathers or husbands."'83
As the notion of corporate religion pushes out of the limited parameters of the
Hobby Lobby decision, however, the threat of unchecked employer interference in
their employees' lives no longer seems buried in history.'84
In discussing the Braunfeldcase, the majority in HobbyLobbylamented that the
merchants involved, who operated their business as a sole proprietorship, would have
been denied a right to be heard if they had incorporated, "without in any way
changing the size or nature of their businesses.""'s What the Court does not seem to
appreciate is that incorporating does change the nature of a business, including the
relationship between the owners and the business. People die; corporations do not.
Corporations aggregate the wealth of a few-or many-and hold that wealth in an
entity with perpetual life. Those owners are not answerable to their communities for
the debts of the corporation. Business owners have a choice when they pick a limited
liability form. Those forms represent an evolution in the law from when small
businesses were the alter ego of their owners. In exchange for all the benefits of the
entity form, one of the few things states still require is a separation between the
owners and the business. The Court rejected this choice in Hobby Lobby, at least as
it pertains to statutory claims under RFRA." 6 They held the language of RFRA does
not "discriminate" between individuals and businesses.8 7
's' See Strine, supra note 156, at 79 (describing employers of the late nineteenth century, including
George Pullman of the Pullman Palace Car Company, and their efforts to engage in 'benevolent'
paternalism").
132 Id. at 81.
183 Sepper, supra note 180, at 1515-16.
134 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Trump Administration Issues Rules
Protecting the Conscience Rights of All Americans (Oct. 6, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/10/06/trump-administration-issues-rules-protecting-the-
conscience-rights-of-all-americans.html [https://perma.cc/8LBQ-9GTN] (providing "conscience
protections to Americans who have a religious or moral objection to paying for health insurance that
covers contraceptive/abortifacient services").
.s. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014); see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961).
136 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at2759 ("[W]e reject HHS's argument that the owners of the companies
forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to organize their businesses as corporations rather than
sole proprietorships or general partnerships.").
's7 Id. at 2759, 2768 ("Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens by
employing a familiar legal fiction: It included corporations within RFRA's definition of 'persons."').
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The Court's opinions in Masterpiece Cakeshop could be read as expanding this
trend of ignoring the legal separation between owner and entity. Not one of the five
opinions in the case mention the incorporated status of Masterpiece Cakeshop.88
The corporation was instead described only as "a bakery" that has been "owned and
operated" by Jack Phillips for 24 years.'"' The majority opinion focus exclusively on
Jack Phillips' beliefs without any attempt to attribute those beliefs to the
corporation.' In short, the Court made no effort to distinguish between Jack
Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop.
There are, however, other possible readings of the case. For example, the
majority disposed of the case based on the Commission's "impermissible hostility
toward" Phillips' personal religious beliefs."' This holding could suggest that the
Court was merely addressing Jack Phillips' Free Exercise claims.9 2 Because the
Court ultimately did not reach the question of whether to grant an exemption to
Colorado's public accommodations law, it may not have felt it necessary to determine
which, if any, business entities may claim such an exemption.
While it is impossible to predict how the Court will address future claims by
corporations for religious exemptions, such claims will inevitably be raised. If the
Court continues to treat small and family-run businesses as mere extensions of their
owners, it risks creating supercharged shareholders who claim all of the benefits of
the entity form while still maintaining the unity of identity with the corporation as
if they were a sole proprietorship or general partnership. This is not a type of
shareholder contemplated by state corporate law.
133 Nowhere in the opinions does anyJustice mention what type of corporation Masterpiece Cakeshop
is, where it is incorporated, or any other information about the corporate party in the case. Contra Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764, 2765 (2014) (describing the corporate parties to the
case, including their states of incorporation, shareholders, and management structures).
189 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. V. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
190 See, e.g, id. at 1724 (describing Phillips' religious beliefs); 1729 (describing the statements as
regarding Phillips' religious beliefs and as a disparagement of "his religion"). See also id. at 1735 (focusing
on Phillips' religious faith); 1742-43 (describing Phillips' artistry and the way he conceives of his cakes)
(Gorsuch, J. concurring). Only Justice Thomas in his concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, addresses
the argument that Masterpiece Cakeshop is a for profit entity. He dismisses Masterpiece Cakeshop's
profit motive using much the same reasoning as the HobbyLobby opinion - by focusing on the ways that
Phillips operates the bakery in line with his Christian faith. Id. at 1745 (detailing that Phillips closes
Masterpiece Cakeshop on Sundays, "pays his employees a higher-than-average wage," and refuses to "bake
cakes containing alcohol, cakes with racist or homophobic messages, cakes criticizing God, and cakes
celebrating Halloween").
191 Id. at 1729.
192 This reading is weakened by the fact that the Court reversed the Colorado Court of Appeals
decision in its entirety. Id. at 1732.
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